NewsMine — coldwar-imperialism — iran-contra — north-emails — Viewing Item

CHAP04 MSG FROM: NSJT --CPUA TO: NSOLN --CPUA 10/25/85 17:36:05 To: NSOLN --CPUA -- TOP SECRET -- NOTE FROM: Jackie Tillman SUBJECT: INTERESTING GOINGONS Two events recently have really been damn interesting: -- first, Febres breaks relations with the Nicas and there is virtually no reaction, none. No Ecuadoran embassies stoned or demonstrated against, no soapbox speeches denouncing Ecuador as a "tool of the US", no students in the streets, no radical press denounciations to speak of, no attacks against the US....nada. -- ok, then Fidel declares Wed Oct 23 a Latin America Day of Solidarity against the IMF or some damn thing like that. Nowhere in South America is there anything. Now remember, he has had four or five conferences on the debt issue, paying the expenses of hundreds and hundreds of radical Latin Americans to soak up the sun in Havana and listen to his ten hour speeches. In Caracas, a few students gathered in front of the US Embassy and finally moved the demostration back to the university because the turnout was so embarassingly small. In Quito, a few students out in the streets but nothing of consequence. I had lunch today with some South American Agency analysts and they report nothing major or even barely significant happened all over South America. Something is going on here. It isn't that they don't have the assets. They do and show it all the time, especially in labor movements and some political parties around. I would love to construct some sort of action that would test how the Latins really feel about Central America; something that one would imagine would have Castro's folks in the streets but would gague the reaction of the shopowner on the corner. Because we may be farther ahead than we realize. Think about it and lets chat sometime soon. [Three lines deleted, (b)(1)(s) exemption] Last, a US plane is missing, maybe in Nicaragua. It is a Cessna 182, Aircraft # N49-14S. Left Cosomel (island in Gulf of Mexico) going to Costa Rica through Teguc and Managua. Flight time is 3 hrs, 50 minutes--left 1013 Sunday, arrival in San Jose, last heard of in Teguc, no answer from Managua to inquiries. Unlikely drug connection (flying in the wrong direction). Pilots name is Tom Lake, 2 other gringos (Brown and White I think are their names) on board. It could have run out of gas, no fuel stop plotted on flight plan, and this type airplane could just barely make it without refueling. Flight plan, Amber 2 to Managua, then Amber 5 to San Jose--route of flight B-757. Contras have Cessnas. Could it have been shot down? Six months ago another civilian airplan was found i in Costa Rica near Nica border and the site of the crash did not look like a site of a crash, if you get my meaning. All this from "usually reliable source." Let's chat soon. Is it true that POPO Chomorro and gang finally quit Eden? I heard they met with a person named Norton at the WH. Could they have gotten the name wrong? You know the nicas. God love 'em. Chow.... INTERESTING GOINGONS MSG FROM: NSOLN --CPUA TO: NSVMC --CPUA 12/23/85 17:04:28 To: NSVMC --CPUA *** Reply to note of 12/23/85 10:39 -- SECRET -- NOTE FROM: OLIVER NORTH Subject: Nicaragua Finding There is a great rush in that this finding is essential to moving out on the provision of secure telecomms and operational intelligence to the UNO forces, thus enabling them to avoid disasters like last week (54 killed in 1 battle) and conduct secure resupply of forces deep inside Nicaragua. We have committed to tbe DRF that this materiel/info will be avail by the end of the year. Please move VERY VERY expeditiously on the finding -- it has already been informally coordinated w/ the intelligence committees by Elliott, Alan and myself. Nicaragua Finding FROM: NSRBM --CPUA TO: NSELM --CPUA 01/13/86 18:28:42 To: NSELM --CPUA NOTE FROM: ROD B. MCDANIEL Subject: SANCTIONS fyi *** Forwarding note from NSDRF --CPUA 01/13/86 18:18 *** To: NSRBM --CPUA -- SECRET -- NOTE FROM: DONALD R. FORTIER SUBJECT: SANCTIONS ROD, I CONFESS MY EYES SOMETIMES FOG OVER WHEN ECONOMIC ISSUES ARE DISCUSSED (AND I AM IN A FOG TODAY ANYWAY) BUT I DID NOT FEEL COMPLETELY COMFORTABLE WITH THE DISCUSSION OF HOW TO HANDLE ASSETS OF AMERICAN FIRMS IN LIBYA. WOULD YOU ASK ELAINE AND LOU PUGLIARESI TO GET TOGETHER ON THIS AND TALK TO ME IN THE MORNING IF THEY HAVE DIFFERENT THOUGHTS. IT MAY ALREADY BE TOO LATE, BUT I WOULD LIKE THEIR VIEWS. YOU MIGHT CHECK WITH KIMMIT TO SEE IF WE CAN CHEW ON THIS ONE OVERNIGHT. THANKS. FROM: NSWRP --CPUA TO: NSELM --CPUA 01/13/86 19:42:19 To: NSDRF --CPUA DONALD FORTIER NOTE FROM: BOB PEARSON Subject: DISPOSAL OF ASSETS OF US OIL FIRMS IN LIBYA From Morton. *** Forwarding note from NSELM --CPUA 01/13/86 19:06 *** To: NSWFM --CPUA DONALD FORTIER NSWRP --CPUA DONALD FORTIER NOTE FROM: ELAINE MORTON SUBJECT: DISPOSAL OF ASSETS OF US OIL FIRMS IN LIBYA THE HORSE SEEMS OUT OF THE BARN ALREADY. ROD MCDANIEL FOUND OUT FROM TREASURY THAT THEY HAVE ALREADY TOLD AT LEAST TWO OF THE FOUR MAJOR OIL COMPANIES IN LIBYA THAT OUR PREFERRED WAY FOR THEM TO DISPOSE OF THEIR ASSETS THEIR WOULD BE FOR THEM TO TURN THEM OVER TO THEIR EUROPEAN SUBSIDIARIES. IF THE GOAL OF OUR SANCTIONS WAS TO CAUSE DISLOCATION IN THE LIBYAN OIL ECONOMY, THIS CERTAINLY WON'T DO THE TRICK. IS IT MORALLY AND POLITICALLY DEFENSIBLE TO ADVISE THE COMPANIES INSTEAD TO DISABLE THEIR ASSETS IN SOME KEY WAYS SO THAT THE LIBYANS CAN'T JUST COME IN AND USE THEM EFFECTIVELY. MELODRAMATIC MILITARY ANALOGY WOULD BE A SCORCHED EARTH POLICY. IN THIS HIGH TECH INSTANCE, MAYBE THE COMPANIES COULD THROUGH A FEW SPANNERS IN THE WORKS, WRITE OFF THE ASSETS AS A RESPONSE TO FORCE MAJEUR CONDITIONS CAUSED THE THE E.O., AND THEN FIX THINGS UP AGAIN IF AND WHEN THEY RETURN TO A POST-QADHAFI LIBYA. cc: NSELM --CPUA FROM: NSWRP --CPUA TO: NSPBT --CPUA 02/26/86 10:48:00 To: NSJMP --CPUA JOHN M. POINDEXTER NSDRF --CPUA DONALD FORTIER NOTE FROM: BOB PEARSON Subject: Egypt status From Stark. *** Forwarding note from NSJRS --CPUA 02/26/86 09:14 *** To: NSRBM --CPUA JOHN M. POINDEXTER NSWRP --CPUA JOHN M. POINDEXTER NSRBM --CPUA DONALD FORTIER NSWRP --CPUA DONALD FORTIER NOTE FROM: JAMES R. STARK SUBJECT: Egypt status State Egyptian desk reports that Cairo riots started by rumors of extended enlistments for paramilitary police. About 2-3000recruits rioted at their Giza barracks and damaged several hotelsin the area. Army was calledout and has most of rioting undercontrol. Riots spread to other areas of Cairo, including Mahdiwhere most Americans live (and where a police barracks is located).There are no indications of danger or harm to any Americans. Although there have been predictions of growing domestic tensionin Egypt as the economy slides downhill, this incident was totally unexpected. cc: NSHRT --CPUA NSJC --CPUA cc: NSPBT --CPUA NSJRS --CPUA NSEPD --CPUA NSKS --CPUA NSJC --CPUA FROM: NSWRP --CPUA TO: NSJMP --CPUA 03/24/86 17:31:44 To: NSJMP --CPUA JOHN M. POINDEXTER NOTE FROM: BOB PEARSON Subject: Suriname Drug Bust From Hughes. Kathy, please bring to Admiral's attention. ** Forwarding note from NSGPH --CPUA 03/24/86 17:10 *** To: NSRBM --CPUA JOHN M. POINDEXTER NSWRP --CPUA JOHN M. POINDEXTER NSRBM --CPUA DONALD FORTIER NSWRP --CPUA DONALD FORTIER NOTE FROM: Phillip Hughes SUBJECT: Suriname Drug Bust We just received word from State (ARA DAS Dick Holwill) that tomorrow in Miami DEA will make a drug bust resulting from an undercover operation that is expected to result in the arrest of the Foreign Minister of Suriname (Erik Tjon Kie Sim) and theG-4 of the Surinamese army. DEAreportedly has videotape of theForeign Minister offering the full protection and cooperation ofDesie Bouterse's government to a group of Colombian drug traffickers and demanding an "up-front" payment of $10M for this cooperation -- a sum DEA undercover agents eventually bargained down to $1M down and $1M per shipment through Suriname. Suppoesedly the Foreign Minister was also taped offering to use Suriname's diplomatic pouches to smuggle drugs to the US. Pending the approval of Acting Secretary Armacost, State's position is that the Foreign Minister does not enjoy diplomatic immunity here and State has no objection to his being arrested. State has alerted Embassy Paramaribo and instructed them to "button Up" in the expectation of some officially inspired violence if and when this comes down tomorrow. There is no paper on this so far. State will be preparing guidance on this to sharewith us if the bust goes off as expected. cc: NSPBT --CPUA NSEPD --CPUA NSKS --CPUA NSKMH --CPUA NSDFP --CPUA NSDRF --CPUA DONALD FORTIER FROM: NSJRS --CPUA TO: NSJRS --CPUA 03/25/86 19:19:50 To: NSJRS --CPUA NOTE FROM: JAMES R. STARK Subject: Libya: Looking Ahead *** Forwarding note from NSJRS --CPUA 03/25/86 18:32 *** To: NSPWR --CPUA NSVMC --CPUA NSRBM --CPUA DONALD FORTIER NSWRP --CPUA DONALD FORTIER NOTE FROM: JAMES R. STARK Subject: Libya: Looking Ahead Last week, CIA forwarded a memo recommending just such a public statement by the US holding Libya responsible for any terrorist action. It was to be based on the abundant evidence we have collected over the past three months that Qadhafi is accelerating his planning for terrorist operations against American targets. At the time that proposal came in, I opposed it in order to avoid tipping our hand on the FON operation. Now, however, Libya's previous planning together with the Gulf of Sidra beating he has taken will certainly result in Libyan terrorism against Americans. We need to get out some form of statement right away. I've called the Libya task force at State Ops and told them to coordinate a draft with Bob Oakley and CIA using the original CIA paper as a base. I think the statement should be issued by State, but we might also want to consider using a WH press statement. If the Libyans do turn to terrorism, we have several very well developed contingency plans. The only question is-- will we use them. *** Forwarding note from NSPWR --CPUA 03/25/86 15:52 *** To: NSDRF --CPUA DONALD FORTIER NOTE FROM: Peter Rodman SUBJECT: Libya: Looking Ahead Now that we know of Libyan plans to attack U.S. interests in various parts of the world (in addition to the public threats already made), we face two predictable problems: -- We ought to make clear (if we haven't already) that we will hold Libya responsible for any such attacks on U.S. interests. -- Since such attacks are now predictable, do we have contingency plans for responding? Our ships will have left the area; how long will it take them to come back? (Or should we keep them there longer?) Are we prepared to retaliate against Libya if its responsibility for such acts is clear? The dispersal of our ships in the next few days will not be the end of this. I hope we will be prepared. cc: NSJRS --CPUA FROM: NSWRP --CPUA TO: NSPBT --CPUA 03/26/86 19:32:43 To: NSDRF --CPUA DONALD FORTIER NOTE FROM: BOB PEARSON Subject: MORE ON ATTACK ON MISKITOS From Tillman. *** Forwarding note from NSJT --CPUA 03/26/86 18:45 *** To: NSOLN --CPUA NSRFB --CPUA NOTE FROM: Jackie Tillman SUBJECT: MORE ON ATTACK ON MISKITOS Attack occurred yesterday, 3/25. Attacks were against Bilwascama and Kuan. Refugees streaming into Acua in Honduras. Roger Herman has already gone to the press in Teguc. 15 dead, 30 wounded reported. Recalls the Christmas Masacre of 81, the Christmas March with Bishop Shafler of 83. Those bastards. Still no word from CIA if they've confirmed. Have a gut feeling it happened though. cc: NSFH --CPUA NSRKS --CPUA NSRBM --CPUA DONALD FORTIER NSWRP --CPUA DONALD FORTIER cc: NSPBT --CPUA NSJT --CPUA NSEPD --CPUA NSKS --CPUA NSOLN --CPUA FROM: NSWRP --CPUA TO: NSPBT --CPUA 03/26/86 19:35:49 To: NSDRF --CPUA DONALD FORTIER NOTE FROM: BOB PEARSON Subject: SANDINISTA ATTACK AGAINST MISKITOS--URGENT FYI from Tillman. *** Forwarding note from NSJT --CPUA 03/26/86 18:23 *** To: NSOLN --CPUA NSRFB --CPUA NOTE FROM: Jackie Tillman SUBJECT: SANDINISTA ATTACK AGAINST MISKITOS--URGENT As you know, for years now the Miskitos have called me first---they just got word to me that the Sandinistas have attacked innocent Miskito civilians on the Rio Coco apparently trying to smoke out KISAN. These are the Miskitos that they had put in the concentration camps ('82) & recently resettled on the Rio Coco. Roger Herman says, through Adrianna Guillen, that 3500 Miskito refugees have gone into Honduras and need immediate humanitarian assistance---food, shelter, etc. KISAN paramedics are trying to deal with the wounded, fighting with KISAN did occur. Sandinistas may have taken atleast 25 prisoners. Roger cannot reach the Red Cross because it is Holy Week and no one is around. He requested that we contact UNHCR for emergency assistance. I called Alan Friers and he is checking to confirm the story. I also reached Dick Holwill (the only DAS there at this hour) to alert ARA's front office that this attack against the Miskitos is in the process of being confirmed by the Agency, and that they have requested our assistance with the refugees. cc: NSRBM --CPUA DONALD FORTIER NSWRP --CPUA DONALD FORTIER cc: NSJT --CPUA NSEPD --CPUA NSKS --CPUA NSPBT --CPUA FROM: NSWRP --CPUA TO: NSJRS --CPUA 03/28/86 09:29:26 To: NSJMP --CPUA JOHN M. POINDEXTER NOTE FROM: BOB PEARSON Subject: Libya next steps From Stark. *** Forwarding note from NSJRS --CPUA 03/27/86 20:35 *** To: NSOLN --CPUA NSRSM --CPUA NSRBM --CPUA JOHN M. POINDEXTER NSWRP --CPUA JOHN M. POINDEXTER NSRBM --CPUA DONALD FORTIER NSWRP --CPUA DONALD FORTIER -- SECRET -- NOTE FROM: JAMES R. STARK SUBJECT: Libya next steps I met today in Mike Armacost's office with reps from State (Raphel, Oakley, Platt), CIA [Deleted, (b)(1)(c) exemption] Juchniewicz), and DOD (Armitage, Moellering) to discuss next steps for Libya. The most immediate areas of concern are the cascading indications of Libyan terrorist attack and the imminent departure of two of the three CVBGs (Saratoga on April 2 and Coral Sea on April 10). Additionally, DOD/JCS unwillingness to forward any option other than the 4 military targets already identified in Libya remains a problem. Following actions/decisions were made: --US forces will be on [Deleted, (b)(1)(c) exemption] tether to conduct Prairie Fire strikes (menu of one or more of the 4 approved targets) on Libya in response to terrorist attack. Would require new NSPG decision to implement. --Once CVBG level down to one, still have to meet the [Deleted, (b)(1)(c) exemption] Prairie Fire requirement without relying on third country permission to launch strikes, i.e., FB-111 from UK. --About 7 April, group will review whether this can be done with only one CVBG in Med. (I think extending Sara or Coral Sea is a non-starter). JCS option is to bring Enterprise from IO. But this takes longer than [Deleted, (b)(1)(c) exemption] and may not get [Deleted, (b)(1)(c)] due NPW issue. --State drafting cables for us to send to UK, France, Italy via cabinet channels highlighting extensive indicators of Libyan terrorist threat, our resolve to respond, and giving heads up on possible request to stage through them. --DOD will send list of [Deleted,(b)(1)(s) exemption] targets referred to by CJCS at 14 Mar NSPG. They would not consider additional military targets [One line and a half deleted, (b)(1)(s) exemption] or political targets [One line and a half deleted, (b)(1)(s) exemption] due possibility of collateral damage). [One line deleted, (b)(1)(s) exemption] State afraid of terrorist attack fol by airport closure which would prevent extraction of Amcits [Deleted, (b)(1)(s) exemption] --The [One line and a half deleted, (b)(1)(s) exemption] I don't believe it. [One line and a half deleted, (b)(1)(s) exemption] I remain concerned at our inability to get expanded target options out of DOD. The four Prairie Fire targets are a limp-wrist response which don't even put a dent in Libya's military capability. If we have to go in and take casualties, which we surely will, then we ought to make it count for something. I would like to discuss with you Friday. cc: NSPBT --CPUA NSJRS --CPUA NSDRF --CPUA DONALD FORTIER FROM: NSJMP --CPUA TO: NSJRS --CPUA 03/28/86 10:17:59 To: NSWRP --CPUA *** Reply to note of 03/28/86 09:29 -- SECRET -- NOTE FROM: JOHN POINDEXTER Subject: Libya next steps JIM, WHY WON'T THE JCS CONSIDER THE LARGE MILITARY EQUIPMENT DEPOTS IN THE DESERT? I ALSO AM CONCERNED ABOUT COLLATTERAL DAMAGE. THE INTELLIGENCE REPORT ABOUT THE PRO-US FEELINGS OF THE MILITARY RINGS TRUE TO ME. I THINK WE HAVE TO BE CAREFUL TO GO AFTER QUADAFI AND MILITARY EQUIPMENT AND FACILITIES. cc: NSJRS --CPUA JIM STARK NSRBM --CPUA ROD MCDANIEL NSDRF --CPUA DON FORTIER MSG FROM: NSOLN --CPUA TO: NSFH --CPUA 03/28/86 13:59:37 To: NSFH --CPUA -- SECRET -- NOTE FROM: OLIVER NORTH Subject: Libyan terrorism Pls print for Libya terrorism threat file w/ cy to Craig *** Forwarding note from NSJRS --CPUA 03/27/86 12:28 *** To: NSRBM --CPUA JOHN M. POINDEXTER NSWRP --CPUA JOHN M. POINDEXTER NSRBM --CPUA DONALD FORTIER NSWRP --CPUA DONALD FORTIER NOTE FROM JAMES R. STARK SUBJECT: Libyan Terrorism [One line and a half deleted, (b)(1)(s) exemption] that they are planning to attack US Embassy -- presumably in Beirut--tonight. State has the cable and is alerting Reggie Bartholomew. If a terrorist attack is mounted, either in Lebanon or any of the other areas with hard evidence of Libyan invovement, we need to be ready to order implementation of PRAIRIE FIRE. As long as 3 CVBG are in the Med. this won't be a problem, though I would recommend that at least 2 of them stay on a [Deleted, (b)(1)(s) exemption] for now. cc: NSOLN --CPUA NSVMC --CPUA NSJC --CPUA G Libyan terrorism MSG FROM: NSOLN --CPUA TO: NSFH --CPUA 03/28/86 14:00:57 To: NSFH --CPUA -- SECRET -- NOTE FROM: OLIVER NORTH Subject: Anything New?? Pls print for me. *** Forwarding note from NSRCM --CPUA 03/26/86 21:43 *** To: NSOLN --CPUA *** Reply to note of 03/26/86 09:19 -- SECRET -- NOTE FROM: ROBERT MCFARLANE Subject: Anything New?? In re Blowpipe, I think I would look for other sources. Surely the Brits have sold them elsewhere. How about Oman or Pakistan or Singapore? I wouldn't have any hesitation about talking to Yusef al alawi (Foreign Minister) about it. This [?] brings me to the second item. Next week would be a good time to travel [word illegible]. I have no appointments until a commitment to give a terrorism speech [at the?] Simon Weisenthal Center in La>a on sunday April 6 (along with BB [name illegible], Ted Koppel and Brian Jenkins). So we could leave as soon as they [word illegible] from tomorrow through Saturday April 5. And maybe we could stop by [word illegible]. Although I guess we would need some kind of cover--the Omanis would wonder why we came all that way. I hope you and Betsy get a little time together this weekend. God knows you deserve it. T Anything New?? MSG FROM: NSOLN --CPUA TO: NSWGH --CPUA 04/21/86 10:03:55 To: NSWGH --CPUA *** Reply to note of 04/21/86 12:57 -- SECRET -- NOTE FROM: OLIVER NORTH Subject: Special Mtg: Central America Will, please pass to Don: This weekend's trip to Honduras and El Salvador was the most depressing venture in my four years of working the Centam issue. There is great anxiety that the Congress will not act in time to stave off a major defeat for the resistance. This sense exists in the Govts. of Honduras and El Salvador but most alarmingly is now evident in the resistance itself. The lack of a reliable source of resupply has not only affected combat operations, it is now beginning to affect the political viabllity of the UNO leadership. Bermudez, in front of the Southern Front commander, El Negro Chammoro questioned the need for UNO and the drain of scarce resources to support the Atlantic and Southern fronts. While he committed to send in 6-8000 troops in the next few days, he openly admitted in front of Bustillio that they wd have to come back out in 15-20 days if there is no resupply. As known, their most pressing need is for anti-air, but other things are now running short as well. The entire force is back to 1 meal per day and no more boots, uniforms, packs, ponchos or weapons are available for tbe new recruits. All new trainees will be turned away effective today. All hospitalization for WIAs will cease at the end of the week. Troops returning to Nicaragua this week will carry only70-100 rounds of ammo instead of the 500 they had been carrying. No new radio batteries are available so there is no way to pass commands or intelligence. Tbe picture is, in short, very dismal unless a new source of "bridge" funding can be identified. While we should not raise specific sources with Fred et al, we need to explore this problem urgently or there won't be a force to help when the Congress finally acts. Warm regards, North I Special Mtg: Central America FROM: NSRBM --CPUA TO: NSDRF --CPUA 05/02/86 18:05:08 To: NSDRF --CPUA DONALD FORTIER NSJMP --CPUA JOHN M. POINDEXTER NOTE FROM: ROD B. MCDANIEL Subject: More Libyan Fighting *** Forwarding note from NSVMC --CPUA 05/02/86 16:28 *** To: NSRBM --CPUA DONALD FORTIER NSWRP --CPUA DONALD FORTIER NSRBM --CPUA JOHN M. POINDEXTER NSWRP --CPUA JOHN M. POINDEXTER -- SECRET -- NOTE FROM: Vincent Cannistraro SUBJECT: More Libyan Fighting Libyan [Deleted, (b)(1)(s) exemption] have just informed us that some street fighting has broken out in Tripoli once again. This time appears related to revolutionary committee types a being attacked by Tripoli civilians. In addition they report the commander of Um Attigah air base (formerly Wheelus A.B.) has been arrested. This would be second senior Air Force officer arrested. Leader of Tarhuna army rebellion, Colonel Muhammad Sanussi, apparently still at large and in hiding. [Deleted, (b)(1)(s) exemption] types also report that food is again scarce in Tripoli and dissatisfaction with Qadhafi is growing. [Five lines deleted, (b)(1)(s) exemption] cc: NSHRT --CPUA NSRBM --CPUA NSOLN --CPUA NSJRS --CPUA NSPWR --CPUA FROM: NSOLN --CPUA TO: NSJMP --CPUA 05/06/86 00:04:05 To: NSJMP --CPUA *** Reply to note of 05/02/86 23:01 -- SECRET -- NOTE FROM: OLIVER NORTH Subject: CONTRA PROJECT I know that many have provided input re this missive, but before I depart for a day and one half, let me try to respond briefly: Notwithstanding some of the historical inaccuracies in Ben's book -and the fact that many legislative constraints have been imposed on the President since Truman and Eisenhower, there are still several things which can - and perhaps should be done. When I was in El Salvador two weeks ago, Bustillo again raised the issue of Salvadoran, Guatemalan and Honduran support for a "liberated zone" in Nicaraguan territory. I am very reluctant to raise this for fear that we will be accused of manipulating the event (a la the Tonkin Gulf accusations) - but it is entirely likely that within the next 6 to 8 weeks, the resistance will make a major effort to capture a principal coastal population center, run up the blue and white Nicaraguan flag, salute it - an scream like hell for help. At that point the rest of the world will wait to see what we do - recognize the new territory - and UNO as the govt - or evacuate them as in a Bay of Pigs. It will undoubtedly be a major crisis - for us and many others. News of this plan leaking out could well doom it and we may even want to in order to prevent it. The important thing to know is that Bermudez, Chamorro and the Indian military leaders have already talked to Bustillo, the Guatemalans and the [Deleted, (b)(1)(s) exemption] - and they all said the same thing: it depends on what the Gringos do. The Salvadorans clearly relish the thought of using their airforce to bomb hell out of Sandinista tanks counterattacking up muddy roads. They wd expect the use of presidential emerg authorities to replenish expenditures and losses. I believe that we cd expect the same action from the Guats, Panamanians, Honduras and [Deleted, (b)(1)(s) exemption] U.S. direct assistance to the Democratic Govt of Nic wd be limited to offshore support, Air cover (but not bombing,) and a guarantee that the introduction of Cuban troops, Migs or a seaborne assault wd be met w/ U.S. military force. My guess is that most of the Latin Americans (not Mexico) will follow our lead w/ recognition and that the American body politic wd respond very favorably to the image of the DRF engaged in a final desperate struggle and that we could act within 4-5 days with significant help - including prompt Congressional action on funds, authorities, etc. It may be the only way we ever get to help given that O'Neill is working to screw them again and that there seems to be no stopping DRF planning for the scenario described above, anyway. The DRF has finally had it with our empty promises of help tomorrow - and intend to seize the initiative at tremendous risk. They see no other course.There probably isn't any. Warm regards, North o CONTRA PROJECT MSG FROM: NSJMP --CPUA TO: NSOLN --CPUA 05/06/86 01:00:05 To: NSOLN --CPUA *** Reply to note of 05/06/86 00:04 -- SECRET -- NOTE FROM: JOHN POINDEXTER Subject: CONTRA PROJECT Have you talked to Casey about this? h CONTRA PROJECT FROM: NSDRF --CPUA TO: NSJMP --CPUA 05/06/86 16:01:28 To: NSJMP --CPUA JOHN M. POINDEXTER -- SECRET -- NOTE FROM: DONALD R. FORTIER Subject: CONTRA PROJECT Some preliminary thoughts on unilateral action. *** Forwarding note from NSRBM --CPUA 05/06/86 14:34 *** To: NSDRF --CPUA DONALD FORTIER NOTE FROM: ROD B. MCDANIEL Subject: CONTRA PROJECT *** Forwarding note from NSRFB --CPUA 05/06/86 12:15 *** To: NSRBM --CPUA *** Reply to note of 05/03/86 11:17 NOTE FROM: Raymond Burghardt Subject: CONTRA PROJECT I believe Ron Sable has responded on the issue of expedited procedures, noting that this proposal would become available for a vote about the same time as the milcon bill. I leave further comment on legislative strategy to him. On the second part of JMP's note, Elliott, Allen Fiers, Ollie and I plus others discussed this at a RIG meeting yesterday. Brief answer is: yes, we could use 506a to assist a new UNO-led government after dercognizing the Sandinistas. If this involved holding territory in Nicaragua, we would have the task of assisting them in a very difficult defensive operation. The contras have not tried to hold territory in the past because of the difficulty. As Elliott has noted, we may then have to consider naval quarantine and other actions. A second route would be to assist a government-in-exile. This would require Honduran cooperation, which would be a radical departure from their present stance but perhaps not impossible. Abe Sofaer is looking into this in more depth. Our basic conclusion is that the great difficulty and risk involved in these options only underlines the importance of getting aid supported in congress. Elliott notes that Leiken, Cameron and other meddlers say McCurdy is now prepared to support a version which is closer to acceptable (e.g. second vote after nine months, defensive weapons up front, etc.). Abrams recommends, and I concur, that Don should convene an early meeting of the Core Group to look at where we are on the Hill. FROM: NSPWR --CPUA TO: NSJMP --CPUA 05/15/86 09:09:24 To: NSJMP --CPUA JOHN M. POINDEXTER NOTE FROM: Peter Rodman SUBJECT: Memo on Combatting Terrorism This memo was sent over to you last night from Ollie and Bob Earl. I cleared it, but one comment I made did not get reflected. In one or two places it would have you admitting to Cap that the probability of a new US strike against Libya is currently low unless there is new Libyan "spectacular." I agree with you that a new US strike against Libya is unlikely in the absence of a new terrorist "spectacular" clearly attributable to Libya; however, I don't think any of us can say when such an event might come. As far as I can tell, Qadhafi has several plots still cooking. More importantly, I don't think we want to give DoD and JCS any excuse for continued procrastination on coming up with a sensible target list that meets our political criteria. There is no excuse for not being ready when the next big terrorist event occurs. If it happened today, we would be nowhere near ready. cc: NSOLN --CPUA NSRLE --CPUA NSJRS --CPUA NSRBM --CPUA NSHRT --CPUA NSVMC --CPUA MSG FROM: NSOLN --CPUA TO: NSJMP --CPUA 09/06/86 15:31:36 To: NSJMP --CPUA *** Reply to note of 09/02/86 16:03 -- SECRET -- NOTE FROM: OLIVER NORTH Subject: Iran Last night at 2330 our Project Democracy rep. in Costa Rica called to advise that the Arias Govt [One line deleted, (b)(1)(s) exemption] "was going to hold a press conference today (Saturday) announcing that an illegal support operation for the Contras had been taking place from an airfield in Costa Rica for over a year. The names of two Americans Secord and [Deleted, (b)(1)(s) exemption] were going to be predominantly mentioned. I called [Deleted, (b)(1)(s) exemption] to confirm the info and he returned call at 0030 verifying the info. I then had a conference call w/ Tambs, Abrams and Fiers and we agreed on the following sequence: -- North to call Pres. Arias and tell him that if the press conference were held, Arias [One line deleted, (b)(1)(s) exemption] wd never see a nickel of the $80M that McPhearson had promised him earlier on Friday. --Tambs then called Arias from his leave location in W. Va. and confirmed what I had said and suggested that Arias talk to Elliott for further confirmation. --Arias then got the same word from Elliott. --[One line deleted, (b)(1)(s) exemption] At 0300 Arias called back to advise that there wd be no press conference and no team of reporters sent to the airfield. As a precaution, the Project a/c were flown to Ilopango last night and no project personnel remain in site at the field other than local guards (8). Fiers advises today that this operation vas timed to coincide w/ the Conference on our $100M and was directed by the Cubans. [Two lines deleted, (b)(1)(s) exemption] - but that I wd reconsider if things looked better next wk. I recognize that I was well beyond my charter in dealing w/ a head of state this way and in making threats/offers that may be impossible to deliver, but under the circumstances and w/ Elliott's concurrence - it seemed like the only thing we could do. Best of all, it seems to have worked. I believe that it is important that you or Al or both make a trip down there again as soon as the $100M is approved so that someone w/ more horsepower than I can look Arias - [One line deleted, (b)(1)(s) exemption] very aware of our resolve in making this project work. If Al were to go it wd be a good opportunity for him to become familiar w/ some of the faces which will be critical to this effort if it is to succeed. V/R North MSG FROM: NSOLN --CPUA TO: NSJMP --CPUA 09/25/86 11:23:45 TO: NSJMP --CPUA *** Reply to note of 09/13/86 12:01 -- SECRET -- NOTE FROM: OLIVER NORTH Subject: Public Affairs Campaign on Central America Elliott Abrams has just called from New York, followed by an urgent call from Fiers. Last night Costa Rican Interior Minister Garion held a press conference in San Jose and announced that Costa Rican authorities had discovered a secret airstrip in Costa Rica that was over a mile long and which had been built and used by a Co. called Udall Services for supporting the Contras. In the press conference the minister named one of Dick's agents (Olmstead) as the man who set up the field as a "training base for U.S. military advisors." Damage assessment: Udall Resources, Inc., S.A. is a proprietary of Project Democracy. It will cease to exist by noon today. There are no USG fingerprints on any of the operation and Olmstead is not the name of the agent - Olmstead does not exist. We have moved all Udall resoucces (48K) to another account in Panama, where Udall maintained an answering service and cover office. The office is now gone as are all files and paperwork. The bottomline is that [One line deleted, (b)(1)(s) exemption] Elliott has said that he and the Secretary want [One line deleted, (b)(1)(s) exemption] I strongly urge that you concur with the Secretary's recommendation. [One line deleted, (b)(1)(s) exemption] Public Affairs Campaign on Central America FROM: NSAGK --CPUA TO: NSWRP --CPUA 10/10/86 18:54:22 To: NSWRP --CPUA NOTE FROM: Alton G. Keel Subject: Materials on Hasenfus case Thanks. *** Forwarding note from NSWRP --CPUA 10/10/86 18:41 *** To: NSJMP --CPUA JOHN M. POINDEXTER NOTE FROM: BOB PEARSON SUBJECT: Materials on Hasenfus case SitRoom is pulling together set of materials per AGK request. OLN will furnish additional points via PROFS note. SitRoom will dacom their materials when assembled, to include statement issued by VP, press guidance used by State, reports on statements by Lugar, Durenberger, Kerry, Pell, and other material that may be useful. Hanley has received number of calls and emphasized two issues: Administration support for democratic resistance remains unchanged, and NSC has done nothing beyond the law with respect to any activities in Central America, and in particular has had no connection whatever with the downed plane or Hasenfus. These will be delivered overnight. cc: NSFEG --CPUA NSPBT --CPUA NSAGK --CPUA ALTON G. KEEL

AREADME CHAP01 CHAP02 CHAP03 CHAP04 CHAP05 CHAP06 CHAP07 CHAP08 CHAP09 CHAP10 CHAP11 CHRON { November 22 1986 } WHOSWHO Files Listed: 14

Correction/submissions

CIA FOIA Archive

National Security Archives

This site contains copyrighted material the use of which has not always been specifically authorized by the copyright owner. We are making such material available in our efforts to advance understanding of environmental, political, human rights, economic, democracy, scientific, and social justice issues, etc. We believe this constitutes a 'fair use' of any such copyrighted material as provided for in section 107 of the US Copyright Law. In accordance with Title 17 U.S.C. Section 107, the material on this site is distributed without profit to those who have expressed a prior interest in receiving the included information for research and educational purposes. For more information, go to: http://www.law.cornell.edu/uscode/17/107.shtml. If you wish to use copyrighted material from this site for purpose of your own that go beyond 'fair use', you must obtain permission from the copyright owner.